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Abstract
This paper re-examines the impact of consumption and capital income taxes on (a) the
incentive to undertake risky investment and (b) the revenue generated from such taxes. It
challenges a well-known claim in the literature that a capital income tax with full loss offset
can leave incentives to invest "basically unaffected" because the tax liability is offset by a
reduction in the post-tax risk of the investment. Instead, it argues that such a tax would
have a significantly negative impact on the incentive to invest.
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"Over the last 50 years, U.S. stocks have given a real return of about 9% on average. Of
this, only about 1% is due to interest rates; the remaining 8% is a premium earned for holding
risk.” Cochrane (2001).
1. Introduction
The literature on tax and risky investment seems to have reached a consensus about the incen-
tives generated by a tax on capital income. This consensus is summarised by Gordon (1985),
which states that "taxation of corporate income can leave corporate investment incentives, and
individual savings incentives, basically unaffected, in spite of sizable tax revenues collected"
(Gordon, page 1). Others have applied a similar logic to capital income more generally. For ex-
ample, Hubbard (1997) states that "in contrast to the base of the consumption tax, the income
tax includes ... the rate of return on a marginal riskless project ... If only the risk-free interest
rate is exempt under a consumption tax (relative to an income tax), the stimulus to domestic
household saving may not be large" (Hubbard, page 140). Auerbach (2008), citing Hubbard,
claims: "Hubbard argues that since both the income tax and the consumption tax hit economic
rents, and since both tax the returns to risk-taking in the same manner, the only distinction
between their treatments of capital income is the income tax on the safe rate of return. As this
safe rate of return is not large, the distinction between the income tax and consumption tax
does not appear to be large, either" (Auerbach, page 27). These are striking claims implying,
according to Weisbach (2004), that a choice between a capital income tax and a consumption
tax can be made on the basis of administrative costs: "a Haig-Simons tax is basically the same
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as a consumption tax (which imposes a zero rate of tax on capital), and the debate between the
two tax bases is not particularly meaningful. The decision might best be made on administrative
grounds" (Weisbach, page 1).
This paper challenges this consensus. It agrees that the basic difference between a consump-
tion tax and an income tax is in the treatment of the risk-free element of the return. However, it
argues that this creates a substantial difference in incentives between the two taxes. Gordon’s
claim does hold for consumption taxes, or equivalently a cash flow tax, or expenditure tax. But
it does not hold for a capital income tax or tax on corporate income.
Contributions dating back to Domar and Musgrave (1944), and including Tobin (1958),
Mossin (1968) and Stiglitz (1969) have all analysed how an income tax passes risk from the
investor to the government. If individuals no longer bear that risk, then with a pure income
tax with full offset, this suggests that individuals would take on more risk. Gordon (1985),
Bulow and Summers (1984) and Kaplow (1994) all consider a general equilibrium framework in
which the government passes the risk back to the private sector. In particular, Gordon sets up
a general equilibrium model which demonstrates conditions under which a set of taxes meets
the conditions of raising revenue while having no effect on investment incentives. However, it
is straightforward to show that the set of taxes derived by Gordon is equivalent to a cash flow
tax, but not to a capital income tax.
The basis of Gordon’s claim that a corporate income tax has little effect on incentives to
invest arises from an analysis of the cost of capital. In the absence of tax, the required expected
return on an investment can be decomposed into two components, a risk-free rate of return and a
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risk premium. For an investment with a stochastic return p˜ (where a tilde indicates a stochastic
variable), the minimum required expected rate of return is E(p˜) = r+γ, where r is the risk-free
rate of return and γ is the risk premium. Now introduce a tax at rate τ on the stochastic
return, p˜, and assume that r is unaffected. The required expected post-tax return must satisfy:
(1 − τ)E(p˜) = r + γT , where γT is the risk premium in the presence of tax. If the underlying
risk of the investment does not change, the risk premium is reduced by the same factor, (1− τ),
so that γT = (1− τ)γ. Solving for E(p˜) in the presence of tax yields E(p˜) = r/(1− τ)+γ. That
is, the impact of the tax is to raise the cost of capital only on its risk-free element. Given r =1%
and γ =8%, as cited from Cochrane (2001) above for example, a 50% tax rate would raise the
required rate of return only from 9% to 10%.
This paper does not dispute this analysis. However, it argues that such a rise in the cost
of capital represents a significant disincentive to invest. The reason is that in comparing the
cost of capital in this way in the presence and absence of tax, it is assumed that the risk of the
investment is unchanged. That implies that the tax requires the additional return to be risk
free. But this is important. Consider a marginal risky investment, which has an expected rate
of return of 9%. The market values the stochastic return from this investment at the same price
as the return from an equivalent risk-free investment which earns 1%. So, if the tax requires
an additional 1% return risk-free, this must double the pre-tax market value of the investment.
The change from 9% to 10% overall is not a small, insignificant, change in the required expected
pre-tax rate of return, it is a very substantial change.
Gordon (1985) pointed out that a tax which gave relief for the risk-free element of the return,
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and which was returned in lump-sum fashion to individuals, would have no economic effects.
He also showed that such a tax could raise considerable revenue, implying that the average tax
rate is a poor measure of investment incentives. This paper argues that these claims refer to a
cash flow tax, or a consumption tax. A capital income tax does not give relief for the risk-free
element of the return. While this difference from a cash flow tax implies that the income tax
would raise more revenue, it also implies that it would impose a considerable disincentive to
invest.
This paper attempts to demonstrate this more formally, while making a comparison between
these two alternative forms of taxation: a cash flow tax, and an income tax, both with full loss
offset. The setting analysed is an investment with a required rate of return which may depend on
the tax levied. As such it is natural to consider the taxes analysed to be levied on a corporation,
or other business. However, the general principles involved apply also to a personal tax on the
return to individual saving, where the saver faces a given pre-tax rate of return.1 The paper
also attempts to shed light on various statements in the literature about a "tax on the risk
premium", and the market value of such a tax. It also reconciles the results in this paper with
those of Gordon (1985). Finally, it proposes a measure of the impact of a tax in the incentive
to invest which is independent of the risk of the investment project. Rather than basing the
measure on the cost of capital, it bases it on the current market value of the returns to a marginal
investment. This is equivalent to a typical empirical measure of the cost of capital which ignores
risk.
1The general equilibrium effects of a residence-based tax on saving in a small open economy would generally
differ from those of a source-based tax on corporate income. This paper abstracts from these general equilibrium
considerations.
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2. Project appraisal in the presence of risk
A crucial part of understanding the role of risk in affecting the impact of taxes on investment is
determining how risk is priced. The fundamental approach used here is a simple value function,
V [x˜] which gives the current market value (in period t) of a stochastic cash flow x˜ arising in
one period’s time (period t + 1). This approach is consistent with the "fundamental" pricing
equation of Cochrane (2001):
V [x˜] = E (m˜x˜) (2.1)
where m˜ is a stochastic discount factor. This discount factor can be generated from a simple
two-period model of consumption, in which the investor optimally allocates consumption over
periods t and t + 1. Given a utility function u(c), where c is consumption, and a rate of time
preference, β, then
m˜ = β
u′(c˜t+1)
u′(ct)
. (2.2)
If there were no uncertainty, then m would simply reflect the risk-free rate of interest, r
- that is, m = 1/(1 + r). More generally, E(m˜) = 1/(1 + r). Using this, and expanding the
expected value of the product of m˜ and x˜, we can also write V [x˜] as:
V [x˜] = E (m˜)E(x˜) + cov(m˜, x˜)
=
E(x˜)
1 + r
+ cov(m˜, x˜). (2.3)
The first term on the RHS of this expression is the value of receiving a certain E(x˜) next period.
The second term captures the effect of risk. Note that, given strict concavity of the utility
function, cov(m˜, x˜) has the opposite sign to cov(c˜t+1, x˜). Hence if x˜ is positively correlated with
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c˜t+1, then cov(m˜, x˜) < 0, implying a lower V [x˜].
The value function V [.] satisfies value additivity, or linear pricing, which implies that for
any stochastic cash flows A˜ and B˜, and scalars a and b:
V [aA˜+ bB˜] = aV [A˜] + bV [B˜]. (2.4)
Value additivity is satisfied in all asset valuation models, including the CAPM, and is implied
by the more primitive concept of no arbitrage (see Dybvig and Ross, 1989). This approach is
therefore quite general.
One of the central issues in investigating the impact of taxes on investment is whether
- for a given distribution of x˜ - the introduction of the tax affects m˜ and hence V [.]. One
of the contributions of Gordon (1985) is to consider a general equilibrium framework. While
introducing a symmetric tax may reduce the dispersion of possible outcomes to the investor,
ceteris paribus, the overall level of risk in the economy is not reduced. Gordon considers a model
in which tax revenues are passed back to consumers as a lump sum, and derives conditions under
which asset prices and investment are unaffected by the tax.2.
This paper does not present a general equilibrium model. The main reason for not doing
so is that the insights of the paper can be made in a simpler way by assuming that m˜ is not
affected by the introduction of tax. In general, given (2.2), m˜, and hence V [.], do depend on
the allocation of consumption between periods t and t + 1 which will be generally be affected
by taxes. That is, the pricing of future stochastic cash flows will generally be affected by the
2Whether or not the government can absorb risk costlessly plays an important role in other contexts as well,
such as in comparing alternative forms of consumption tax; see Zodrow (1995).
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introduction of a tax. However, as Gordon implicitly shows, m˜ would not be affected by the
introduction of a symmetric cash flow tax in which the revenues were paid back in a lump sum to
individuals. In addition, in a small open economy where companies can access the world capital
market, a source-based corporate income tax should have no effect the post-tax required rate
of return, and also in this case the pricing of future stochastic cash flows within the company
will also not generally be affected by domestic taxation. In what follows we abstract from any
general equilibrium effects in order to focus on the direct impact of taxation. That is, we assume
throughout that m˜ and V [.] and are unaffected by tax.
Consider now a very simple investment. An asset is purchased for one dollar in period t. In
period t+ 1, it generates a stochastic return, R˜. The asset is then sold for its stochastic value,
K˜ = 1− δ˜, where δ˜ is the stochastic economic depreciation rate. The total return R˜ incorporates
a financial return, denoted p˜, plus compensation for the reduction in the value of the asset, δ˜,
that is: R˜ = p˜+ δ˜. Hence R˜+ K˜ = 1+ p˜. The period t value of the period t+1 stochastic cash
flows can be written as
V ∗ = V
[
R˜+ K˜
]
= V [1 + p˜]
=
1 +E(p˜)
1 + r
+ cov(m˜, p˜) (2.5)
where an asterisk denotes a value in the absence of tax. Deducting the cost of the investment
from this gives the net present value of the investment, or, economic rent:
NPV ∗ = −1 + V ∗. (2.6)
The project is worth undertaking if NPV ∗ is positive, but not otherwise.3
3 In the context of the investment literature, given that the initial cost of the asset is 1, then V ∗ can also be
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Much of the investment literature works with the cost of capital, the minimum expected
pre-tax rate of return on the investment. Setting NPV ∗ = 0, and solving for the implied value
of E(p˜) yields the cost of capital in the absence of tax:
NPV ∗ = 0⇒
E(p˜) = c∗ = r − (1 + r)cov(m˜, p˜) = r + γ. (2.7)
Here γ represents the risk premium.
We now introduce taxation. It is useful to begin with the benchmark case of a pure cash
flow tax, which can be regarded as a consumption tax. We then consider a "pure" income tax,
defined below.
3. A Cash Flow Tax
Consider first a symmetric tax4 levied at rate τ on all net cash flows of the investment set out
in the previous section. The tax generates a rebate worth τ on the investment in period t, and
taxes the entire cash flows, 1 + p˜ in period t+ 1. The market value in period t of this tax is
TCF = −τ + τV [1 + p˜] = τNPV ∗ (3.1)
and the net present value of the investment is
NPV CF = −(1− τ) + (1− τ)V ∗ = (1− τ)NPV ∗. (3.2)
Thus, the post-tax value of the investment is proportional toNPV ∗, or economic rent. Note
thought of as a measure of average Q.
4Note that symmetry of the tax system is assumed throughout. Lund (2002) also analyses the case of uncer-
tainty with respect to the tax position (ie. whether the firm is in a profit or loss making position) and hence the
effective tax rate.
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again that this is based on the assumption that the introduction of the tax does not change the
valuation of a given cash flow arising next period: specifically, the valuation function V [.] is
unaffected by tax, since m˜ is unaffected by tax. We also assume that the pre-tax stochastic
return is unaffected by the tax. As a result, the tax is neutral, in the sense that (for 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1)
the tax cannot change the sign of the net present value. If the project is worth undertaking in
the absence of the cash flow tax, it is worth undertaking the presence of the tax. (This is of
course consistent with neither the valuation function, nor the required pre-tax stochastic cash
flow, changing as a result of the tax).
Of course, a well-known interpretation of a cash flow tax is that the government in effect
becomes a shareholder in the project, contributing the same proportion to costs as it takes from
revenues. Given value additivity, splitting an investment into two cannot change its overall
value. The risk associated with each fraction of the investment is the same as the risk associated
with the whole. The tax does not affect the risk perceived by the investor; from her perspective,
the project is simply smaller by a fraction 1− τ . Because there is no tax on a marginal project -
and because the marginal project is the same in the absence and presence of tax - then the cost
of capital under the cash flow tax is exactly the same as in the absence of tax: cCF = r + γ.
Now consider the value of the tax collected by a cash flow tax. The current market value
of the tax in (3.1) is proportional to NPV ∗. For a marginal investment NPV ∗ = 0 and so the
market value of the tax is also zero. However, the expected revenue in period t+ 1 is not zero.
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To see this, consider writing the market value of the tax in another way:
T = τV [1 + p˜− (1 + r)]
= τV [p˜− r] (3.3)
Here the tax rebate of τ received in period t has been expressed as τV [1 + r]; that is, it is
equivalent to receiving τ(1 + r) with certainty in period t + 1. This mirrors the treatment in
Fane (1987) and Bond and Devereux (1995, 2003), who analyse in the presence of uncertainty
generalised cash flow taxes, similar to that of Boadway and Bruce (1984). The generalised R-
based cash flow tax may delay payment of the period t allowance generated by the pure cash
flow tax, but carries it forward at an appropriate mark-up to compensate for the delay, so that
the present value of the allowance remains τ . If the allowance is certain to be paid at some
future date, then the appropriate rate of mark-up is the risk-free rate.
The second line of this expression gives the impression that, for a marginal investment, the
cash flow tax is effectively levied on the risk premium, ie. the stochastic return of the investment,
p˜, less the risk free rate, r. For a marginal investment, the market value of this risk premium is
zero. However, expected revenues are not zero. To see this, consider the expected value of the
tax in period t+ 1, for a marginal investment:
E(T˜CFt+1) = τ [E(p˜)− r]
= τ(1 + r)cov(m˜, p˜) = τγ. (3.4)
Given risk, so that γ > 0, the expected value of the overall tax paid on the investment is
positive. Given the values cited by Cochrane (2001) at the beginning of this paper, across the
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economy E(p˜) = 0.09 and r = 0.01, so that γ = 0.08. So the tax can raise substantial revenue,
despite its market value being zero.
How is this possible? The answer simply reflects the higher return investors demand to
accept risk. To invest in a project of average risk, investors demand a premium eight times the
risk-free return (which compensates only for timing). To summarise:
Proposition 3.1. A cash flow tax with full loss offset does not distort investment decisions;
ex-ante it is a tax only on economic rent. In the absence of economic rent, the tax has no market
value when the investment is undertaken. Ex-post, however, tax revenue is positive. In expected
terms, the tax could be seen as a tax on the risk premium.
4. A "Pure" Income Tax
Now consider a "pure" capital income tax levied at rate τ . This is defined here as a symmetric
tax on the gross return R˜, less an allowance for true economic deprecation, δ˜ - ie. the ex-post
change in the value of the asset. This is equivalent to a tax on the stochastic financial return,
denoted in the presence of the pure income tax as p˜I . The period t market value of the tax is
T I = τV
[
R˜− δ˜
]
= τV
[
p˜I
]
. (4.1)
The difference from the cash flow tax is in the treatment of the allowance. Relative to the cash
flow tax, the income tax implicitly gives an allowance of 1 in period t+1 rather than in period
t (the tax in period t+1 is on p˜I , not on 1+ p˜I). But the treatment of the stochastic income is
the same: the return p˜I is taxed under both taxes. This therefore represents a tax on the full
stochastic financial return, including the risk premium.
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The period t market value of the investment is
V I = V
[
1 + p˜I(1− τ)
]
= (1− τ)V [1 + p˜I ] + V [τ ]
= (1− τ)V ∗ +
τ
1 + r
(4.2)
where we have again used the fact that the non-stochastic part of the return can be discounted
at the risk-free rate of interest, r. The net present value of the project with a given pre-tax
stochastic cash flow, p˜I = p˜, is
NPV I = −1 +
τ
1 + r
+ (1− τ)V ∗
= (1− τ)NPV ∗ −
τr
1 + r
. (4.3)
The last element of (4.3) clearly reduces the NPV below that of the cash flow tax. Hence
it is possible for a project which is worth undertaking in the absence of tax (NPV ∗ > 0) to
become not worth undertaking the presence of tax (NPV I < 0).
This represents a significant impact on the incentive to invest. One way of measuring the
impact on this incentive is to ask what the period t value of the period t+1 stochastic cash flow
would need to be for an investment to be marginal either in the presence or absence of tax. In
the absence of tax, define the stochastic cash flow of a marginal investment to be p˜∗
M
, so that
NPV ∗ = −1 + V [1 + p˜∗M ]
= −
r
1 + r
+ V [p˜∗M ] = 0. (4.4)
Note that the return of capital of 1 in period t+ 1 is risk-free and therefore can be discounted
at the risk-free rate, r. Hence V [p˜∗
M
] = r/(1 + r).
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In the presence of the pure capital income tax, the post-tax net present value of a marginal
investment is
NPV I = −1 +
1
1 + r
+ (1− τ)V
[
p˜IM
]
= 0. (4.5)
In this case V
[
p˜I
M
]
= r/(1 + r)(1− τ). Clearly, then
V
[
p˜IM
]
= V [p˜∗M ] /(1− τ). (4.6)
That is, the impact of tax is to gross up the market value of the break-even required period t
value of the pre-tax stochastic cash flow by a factor 1− τ . This represents a significant impact
on investment incentives.
How does this relate to the approach of Gordon (1985)? To see this, consider what happens
to the cost of capital. In the presence of the income tax, the cost of capital is the value of E(p˜I)
for which NPV I = 0, denoted E(p˜I
M
). Using the approach in (2.5), we have
NPV I = −1 +
1 + (1− τ )E(p˜I
M
)
1 + r
+ cov(m˜, (1− τ)p˜IM) = 0 (4.7)
which implies that
E(p˜I) = cI =
r
1− τ
− (1 + r)cov(m˜, p˜IM) =
r
1− τ
+ γ. (4.8)
Implicitly here we have assumed that the marginal investments in the presence and absence
of tax have the same risk - that is cov(m˜, p˜∗
M
) = cov(m˜, p˜I
M
). The tax therefore requires the
additional return (relative to the case in the absence of tax) to be risk-free. This is equivalent to
the approach of Gordon (1985) and implies that only the risk-free rate is grossed up by 1−τ . But
this does not imply that the disincentive effect of the tax is small. For a marginal investment,
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a risk-free rate of return is only 1%. Yet this is as valuable as a risky investment yielding on
average 9%. So a tax rate of 50%, say, requires a doubling of the value of the investment - as is
expressed more clearly in (4.6)
What about the expected tax revenue in period t + 1? If the stochastic return were the
same irrespective of the tax levied (p˜I = p˜), then the expected period t+ 1 value is
E(T˜ It+1) = τE(p˜)
= E(T˜CFt+1) + τr. (4.9)
So the pure income tax generates an expected revenue only slightly higher than the cash
flow tax. If we take the values considered above, the tax generates expected revenue which rises
from 8% of the value of the investment to 9%: a rise of one eighth.
In sum then, we have shown:
Proposition 4.1. A capital income tax with full loss offset has a significant effect on investment
incentives. This is reflected in the fact that the market value of the returns of a marginal
investment must be grossed up by a factor 1 − τ for an investment to be marginal in the
presence of tax. This tax does have a market value ex-ante. It raises more revenue in expected
terms than the cash flow tax, but only to the extent that it also taxes the risk-free rate of return.
5. Interpretation of the neutral tax in Gordon (1985)
It is worth noting the relationship between these results and those of Gordon (1985). In a
general equilibrium framework, Gordon finds conditions in which the introduction of a set of
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taxes is neutral, in the sense that they have no impact on investment or asset prices. Ignoring
personal taxes and inflation here for simplicity, Gordon’s set of taxes include a property tax5 at
rate T levied in period t+1 on the initial value of the asset (ie. 1 in the case of the investment
considered here). He also considers a capital income tax at rate τ , levied on the financial return
net of the property tax. In the context of the investment considered here, the taxes introduced
by Gordon amount to a total tax liability in period t + 1 of G = −T + τ(p˜ − T ). Gordon
demonstrates that this combination of taxes is neutral if:6
(1− τ)T + rτ = 0. (5.1)
Clearly, for this to hold, a positive capital income tax requires a negative value of T . Solving
for T from this expression, and substituting into the expression for total taxes paid implies that
the total tax liability in Gordon’s model is equal to G = τ(p˜− r). This is identical to the cash
flow tax shown in (3.3). In fact, Gordon’s property tax is exactly equivalent to the allowance
under a generalised cash flow tax. Instead of giving relief of τ in period t, the tax effectively
gives (a certain) relief of τ(1 + r) in period t + 1. Hence the reason that Gordon’s set of taxes
has no impact on investment or asset prices is that they are equivalent to a cash flow tax. They
cannot be considered to be a capital income tax.
6. Measurement of investment incentives
This paper has shown that a capital income tax, even with full loss offset, has a significant
impact on investment incentives. While this is true even when the incentive is measured by the
5Defined as t in Gordon (1985).
6Gordon (1985), p 12.
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cost of capital, it is clear from the literature that this is not generally appreciated. We therefore
propose an alternative measure, essentially the one used above.
Consider the investment analysed in this paper. In the absence of tax, the cost is 1, and
one period later, the return is 1+ p˜. To calculate the cost of capital, we solve for the value of the
expected stochastic return E(p˜∗
M
) which generates a marginal investment for which NPV ∗ = 0.
We can do the same in the presence of any arbitrary tax, solving in this case for expected value,
E(p˜T
M
) which generates NPV = 0. A marginal effective tax rate can be defined as
EMTRE =
E
[
p˜T
M
]
−E [p˜∗
M
]
E
[
p˜T
M
] . (6.1)
where all the expected values refer to the case of marginal investments, in the presence or absence
of tax.
A slight modification of this is to replace the expected values of p˜ with their market values
in period t: V [p˜∗
M
] and V [p˜T
M
], where these represent market values of the returns to marginal
investments in the absence and presence of tax respectively. The advantage of using these values
is that the market value takes into account the risk associated with the stochastic return. This
yields a natural alternative measure of the effective marginal tax rate as
EMTRV =
V
[
p˜T
M
]
− V [p˜∗
M
]
V
[
p˜T
M
] . (6.2)
In the case of the cash flow tax, EMTRCF
E
= EMTRCF
V
= 0. However, in the case of
the pure capital income tax analysed above, the two measures give very different indications of
investment incentives. Based on the standard measure using expected values, the pure capital
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income tax has an effective marginal tax rate of
EMTRIE =
τr
r + γ(1− τ)
. (6.3)
Clearly this measure depends on the risk premium, γ. By contrast, given the expression
for V [p˜] in the case of a pure capital income tax in (4.5), the alternative measure based on the
period t market value is
EMTRIV = τ. (6.4)
Evaluated at r = 0.01, γ = 0.08 and τ = 0.5, EMTRI
E
= 10% and EMTRI
V
= 50%. This paper
has made the case that the value of the EMTRI
E
is misleading and needs to be treated with
caution.7 By contrast, EMTRI
V
generates a more appropriate measure of the disincentives
generated by the tax.
Many studies have measured effective marginal tax rates to make comparisons over time,
and across countries and companies, and have used them in econometric investigation of the
impact of taxes on investment. In practice, it would be extremely difficult to measure V [p˜] to
enable EMTRV to be calculated. However, in practice, I am also not aware of any empirical
studies which explicitly take account of risk in measuring EMTRE. In practice, it is common to
ignore the treatment of the risk premium, and in effect to treat the effect of the tax as grossing
up the entire cost of capital by 1− τ , instead of grossing up just the risk-free element. Following
this approach by setting γ = 0 in (6.3) yields EMTRI
E
= τ . By ignoring risk, common empirical
practice therefore yields an appropriate measure of the impact of the tax on incentives.8
7This mirrors the results of Gordon and Wilson (1989), who examine the efficiency cost of taxing risky capital
income, and show that the appropriate tax rate to use is the market value of taxes paid on a marginal investment,
which is identical across all marginal investments, whatever their characteristics.
8This applies also in a more general framework, allowing for depreciation at a given rate.
18
7. Conclusion
This paper re-examines the impact of taxes on the incentive to invest in the presence of risk. It
uses a general framework for the pricing of risk to analyse a simple investment which generates
a stochastic cash flow one period after the investment is undertaken.
Using this framework, the paper disputes the claim of Gordon (1985) that "taxation of
corporate income can leave corporate investment incentives, and individual savings incentives,
basically unaffected, in spite of sizable tax revenues collected" (Gordon, page 1). The paper
shows that such a claim does hold for a cash flow tax - equivalent to the tax analysed by Gordon
which he describes as a tax under which "a risk-free investment would pay no taxes on net" (page
12). The market value of the tax revenue received from such a tax on a marginal investment
is zero. However, the expected value of future tax revenues is positive. The difference between
these two perspectives reflects the risk premium associated with risky investment. In effect, the
government shares in the risk, but also takes a share of the risk premium. The risk premium
itself has zero market value, by definition.
However, this paper shows that the first part of Gordon’s claim does not hold for a standard
tax on capital income. Instead, it argues that the taxation of corporate income can have large
effects on investment incentives. Gordon shows that, for a given level of risk, only the risk-free
element of the cost of capital is grossed up by the tax rate. This has only a small effect on
the overall measured cost of capital, but in this formulation, the whole of the additional return
has to be risk-free. That implies significant effect on investment incentives. Such a tax raises
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slightly more revenue in expected terms than the cash flow tax. However, it does so at the
cost of a significant effect on incentives. This implies that, contrary to the claim of Weisbach
(20004), the cash flow tax - or equivalently, a consumption tax - has very different properties
from a Haig-Simons income tax.
This paper proposes an alternative measure of incentive effects, based on the change in the
required market value of the pre-tax stochastic cash flows induced by the introduction of tax,
rather the change in the required expected rate of return. This is independent of risk of the
project.
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